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Abstract 
The economists have focused on credit crunch since 1990’s. The economists are 
not in consensus as to what constitutes the credit crunch. The differences in 
definitions come from the causes of credit contraction. Credit crunch is generally 
accepted as an enormous decline period in credit supply. Although the credit 
crunch is seen as a supply phenomenon, some economists define it as a demand 
issue. Investment declines significantly as result of an increase in credit rationing. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the dependence of private investment 
on money and credit supply in Turkey. In other words, we want to quantify the 
effect of credit contraction in the banking sector on private fixed investment. 
VAR model is used to identify the existence of credit crunch through four 
economic variables: Private fixed investment, money stock (M2), bank loans to 
private sector and interest rate of commercial loans for the period ranging from 
2003:01 to 2010:08. According to results of this study, it can be said that the 
credit crunch that we dealt with as a supply phenomenon leads to an investment 
collapse (slump) in Turkey.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section I provides theoretical background of credit 
channels and credit crunch. Section II summarizes recent empirical studies. 
Section III describes variables and discusses the empirical findings of the model. 
Section IV provides concluding remarks. 
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1.INTRODUCTION 
1.1.Credit Crunch 
The effects of output level of monetary channels on real variables such as 
employment have been the subject of numerous researches. The effects of Central 
Banks’ open market operations (OMO) in the market by selling or buying bonds 
on variables other than the interest rates are also discussed. In other words, the 
credit channel extends traditional money channel of monetary transmission 
mechanism by affecting the investment decisions of individuals and companies 
(Hubbard, 1994: 7).  
It is observed that the changes in economic variables which are results of business 
cycles are not generally caused by large amount interest rate changes or by the 
changes in the amount of money. For this reason, some other factors that affect 
real economy have been investigated. Some economists have analyzed the effects 
of financial markets on total demand changes with micro-analysis. Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) have named the exaggeration of the effects in initial 
shocks in total demand due to the financial conditions of the market as “financial 
accelerator”. 
For many companies, banks are the only source for funding of investment 
projects. These firms that are rather small and medium-scaled cannot finance their 
projects by issuing securities in financial markets. They usually borrow funds at 
loanable funds market from financial institutions and often through banks. 
Therefore, changes in credit supply directly affect the investment projects and 
budget constraints of firms and thus their spending decisions (Saarenheime, 
1995:7). The interaction between net investments and wealth was examined by 
Gertler and Hubbard (1988), Sharpe (1994), Mishkin (1977, 1978) and by many 
other empirical studies and also, Bernanke (1991) showed in his study that credit 
supply had an important role in the determination of potential output level 
(Hubbard, 1994: 12). In cases where the financial system is bank dominated and 
high leverage, monetary shocks make financial system more vulnerable against 
crisis. Under such circumstances, the credit channel of transmission mechanism is 
likely to lead to a credit crunch.    
Especially after 1990, economists focused on the concept of credit crunch. 
However, economists are not able to have a general judgment for the reasons of 
contraction in output. They agree that the credit crunch should be defined as a 
sharp and large period of decline except for the periods of business cycles (Yuan 
and Zimmermann, 1999: 323).   
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When experiencing the crunch of credit, the relationship between credit 
availability and interest is changing. Credit crunch occurs in two different forms 
(Ding, et al, 1998: 7): The credit supply curve shifting to the left through given 
interest rates and in cases of credit rationing (non-price credit rationing) regardless 
of interest rates. Bernanke et. al. (1991) has defined credit crunch as the credit 
supply curve shifting to the left in cases when there is safe real interest rate and 
the nature of potential borrowers were fixed. This case refers to the large amount 
of reduction in credit supply. In particular, the credit slowdown and credit crunch 
periods are mixed with each other.  
Credit slowdown indicates the existence of a general situation. However, credit 
crunch is related to a more specific situation (it is specific because it is related to 
credit existence). In credit crunch, funds to be borrowed over current interest 
cannot be founded even in periods when there is excessive credit demand. In 
addition to that, banks are reluctant to give loans during this period. Due to the 
tendency of direct borrowing in financial markets, flow of funds to banks 
decreases. Decline in deposit accounts of financial intermediaries forces banks to 
achieve reserve requirement ratio which results in credit restraint. For these 
reasons, credit crunch is usually taken as a case of supply side issue (Clair and 
Tucker, 1993: 3). However, it is very difficult to separate the supply and demand 
side effects from each other, because some of the common factors of supply and 
demand reduce the willingness of both supply and demand of loanable funds 
(Ding et al, 1998:5; Ghosh and Ghosh, 1999: 7). In general, the crunch of credit is 
taken as a supply issue in international studies (Kleisen and Tatom, 1992: 24).  
Bernanke et. al. (1991) attributes the decline in credit supply to demand and 
supply factors. That is: The disruption in balance sheet of borrowers during crisis 
periods reduces their credibility. Therefore, their credit demands decline. In 
addition to this, the equity capital of banks falls due to unpaid credit accounts 
which lead banks to narrow the credit supply. Changes in banks’ risk perception; 
(compensation of overall risk and hedging) is forcing them to increase loan 
interest rates (Lamberte, 1999:7). In other words, credit interest rates are rising 
due to the increase in the overall risk ratio. As a result, the credit supply curve is 
shifting to the left. In this case, banks are tending towards risk-free assets. Thus, 
the difference between the loan interest rates and the return of risk-free assets 
(such as treasury bills and government bonds) is growing (Borensztein and Lee, 
2002: 4).   
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1. LITERATURE    
Credit crunch question has been analysed by many studies which are based mostly 
on aggregate data. Bernanke et. al. (1991) couldn’t mention the strict effect of 
credit crunch during and after the recession. They mentioned that credit demand 
factors have contributed in an important way to the slowdown in bank lending. 
Ding, Domaç and Ferri (1998) found evidence of credit crunch in the widening 
gap between loan rates and risk free bond rates. Ferri and Kang (1999) had found 
that banks with lower capital reduce their credit amount and raise their lending 
rate instantly. Kim (1999) and Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) analysed credit crunch by 
looking at demand and supply conditions. While Kim found that the demand for 
bank loans exceeded the loan supply after the financial crisis, Ghosh and Ghosh 
(1999) failed to find an excess demand for credit.  Borenstein and Lee (2002) 
examined the existence of credit crunch after the financial crisis in Korea. This 
study found out that credit crunch was the outcome of the structural changes in the 
financial sector rather than that of general monetary contraction. Kim (1999) 
empirically tested the existence of credit crunch in Korea. The results showed 
that, compared to large firms, small and medium sized firms faced a serious credit 
crunch in the loan market. Saarenheimo’s (1995) study had found that the link 
from credit supply to investment is statistically significant in Finland. The results 
of Lamberte’s (1999) analysis didn’t support the idea that there had been a credit 
crunch in the Philippines after the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The results of 
this study imply that credit crunch is due to recession in business cycles. Bijapur 
(2010) investigated the effectiveness of credit crunch in US economy. The result 
of this study suggests that the weakness of monetary transmission mechanism 
comes from both a “credit crunch effect” and a “recession effect”. However he 
couldn’t differentiate individual effects. 
In addition to monetary base variables, there have been various reasons that cause 
credit crunch in an economy. For instance, declines in bank capital results in 
pressure on banks. Regulators or managers of these banks limit their ability to 
extend new credit. Another reason is the resolution of the failed banks and thrift. 
During and after the resolution process, those intermediaries necessitate increased 
demand for capital. The funds which are used for the health of financial industry 
limit the capital available to fund new loans. In addition to that, severe recessions 
may change bank’s risk perceptions. Their willingness to supply credit is likely to 
be reduced. At the end, the regulatory burden also contributes to credit crunch by 
imposing an extra cost on banks.  
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL  
3.1. Data Selection 
The purpose of this study is to reveal the private fixed investment variable’s 
relation with both money and credit supply variables. For this purpose, the 
problem for the period 2003:01-2010:08 has been tested by means of the 
unrestricted VAR method by using data sets of four variables. The model 
selection was based on the study of Saarenheimo (1995). Based on the VAR 
models formed under this frame, the endogenous variables, money stock, private 
fixed investment and banks’ private loans were used; whereas the exogenous 
variable is the interest rate of commercial loan. The symbols M2, INV, DLOAN 
and INT were used to represent money stock, private fixed investment, banks 
private loans and commercial loans interest rate variables, respectively. The 
private fixed investment data was obtained from the machinery and equipment 
entry. As 89 % of commercial loans are met by deposit banks in the Turkish 
financial system (BDDK, 2007), it was appropriate to use the total commercial 
loans of deposit banks for representing the bank loans. The M2 variable was 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund and the data set of variable was 
obtained from the data base of the Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IMF’s 
IFS), whereas the others were provided by the Turkish Central Bank, Electronic 
Data Delivery System (EVDS).  
3.2. VAR Estimation 
Before using any VAR estimation, it is necessary to control the statistical 
convenience of the variables. First of all nominal variables are deflated by the 
consumer price index (2005=100). Then all variables, except for the commercial 
loans interest rate, are measured in logarithms. Finally it was researched whether 
variables contained seasonality. As INV variable has been determined to contain 
seasonal effects, it was freed from seasonal effects by using the X11 procedure. 
3.2.1. Preliminary Tests of VAR Model 
According to the VAR method, all variables must be stationary. In this context, 
the Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) unit root test was used in order to determine 
whether all variables covered by the models were stationary or not. The variables 
which are not stationary in level, first difference were taken. In other words, as a 
result of the ADF test statistics, it was determined that the INV, DLOAN, M2 and 
INT variables were I(I) (Table 1).  
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Results 
 Level  1st Difference 
Variables    Variables    
INV -1.862 -3.147 0.606 INV -2.729 -2.868 -2.725* 
DLOAN -2.152 -1.057 3.794 DLOAN -3.062* -3.444 -1.807 
M2 -1.524 -1.071 2.804 M2 -5.119* -5.321 -4.249 
INT -1.467 -2.301 -1.6 INT -5.047 -5.069 -5.016* 
Note: Values written in bold show the variables that are static at 5% significance level in first 
difference. 
Before the prediction of a VAR model, the optimal lag length of the model must 
be determined. Likelihood (LR), Prediction Error (FPE), Akaike Info Criterion 
(AIC), Schwarz Criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) statistics were used in 
determining the appropriate lag length. Based on the results of Table 2, the 
optimal lag length was decided to be three which is supported by LR, FPE, AIC 
and HQ.     
Table 2: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Lag LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 NA  2.95E-09 -11.12686  -10.95200* -11.05661 
1 18.87947 2.88E-09 -11.15204 -10.7149 -10.97642 
2 7.560116 3.24E-09 -11.03597 -10.33655 -10.75498 
3  49.52534*  2.03e-09*  -11.50696* -10.54525  -11.12059* 
Note: Values written in bold and indicated with the mark * show the appropriate lag length for 
relevant tests.  
Regarding the Model which has a lag length that was determined to be  three, the 
H0 hypothesis based on the assumption that there is no autocorrelation as the 
significance level (Prob.) values for the LM test are higher than 0.05 for the third 
lag is not rejected.  
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Table 3: VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test 
Lags LM-Stat Prob. 
1 13.09523 0.158 
2 3.629977 0.934 
3 14.20161 0.115 
The reliability of the Model which has a lag length that was determined to be 
three was tested based on the 0.05 significance level by four diagnostics tests as 
the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test, ARCH Test, White 
Heteroskedasticity Test and the Ramsey Reset Test (Table 4). Based on the results 
obtained, the reliability of the applied model was also confirmed with diagnostic 
tests. In addition, the model has tested for structural break by the CUSUM test. 
No structural break was found.   
Table 4: Residual Diagnostic Various Tests 
Diagnostic Tests P-Values-  (3) 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 0.995 
ARCH Test 0.997 
White Heteroskedasticity Test 0.828 
Ramsey Reset Test 0.493 
Notes: 5% significance level was considered. 
3.2.2. Variance Decompositions 
The variance decomposition method is used to overcome the obstacles 
experienced in the interpretation of the parameters in the VAR model and to 
determine the source of the changes that occur in a variable. In this context, the 
variance decomposition results obtained from the estimated Model are presented 
in Table 5.  
According to Table 5, the main source of the variance of the INV variable covered 
by the Model is its own shock. In addition to this, DLOAN with its share of 
average 11,3 % in medium and long-term, is forming the most important source 
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regarding the variance estimation in INV. The M2 variable, on the other hand, 
cannot be presented as the main source regarding the change in INV.  
Table 5: Variance Decomposition of INV 
 Period M2 DLOAN INV 
1 0.0 12.0 88.0 
10 0.4 11.1 88.5 
20 0.5 11.2 88.3 
25 0.5 11.2 88.3 
3.2.3. Impulse- Response Analysis 
In Figure 1, a standard deviation obtained for a period of eighteen months shows 
the term responses of the INV variable to M2 and DLOAN shocks. In these figures, 
the period of time after shocks is shown on the horizontal axis in a monthly scale 
and the response to shocks of variables is shown as proportional on the vertical 
axis. In this analysis, the required confidence intervals for the impulse-response 
functions were provided by using the Monte Carlo simulations (± 2 for standard 
error).  
According to Figure 1, when a standard deviation shock was given to the M2 
variable, the response of the variable to its own shock has been in a decrease 
direction from the initial period to the second period. Theoretically, the response 
of M2 shows a monetary contraction and the INV is expected to have a direct 
decreasing effect on the decrease of monetary contraction. However, the INV 
reached levels of 0.000408 in the second period by moving in the opposite 
direction. After all, based on variance decomposition, it is normal that INV 
responds in this direction.    
As shown in Figure 1, when a standard deviation shock was given to the DLOAN 
variable, the response of the variable to its own shock has been in a decrease 
direction from the initial period to the third period. In the third period, DLOAN 
showed an increase of 100 % compared to the initial period. Credit crunch had a 
negative impact on INV. In other words, INV decreased from the initial period to 
the third period by providing immediate response to credit crunch. The important 
point herein is that INV shows a decrease of 140 % when DLOAN decreases 100 
%.  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE STUDIES 
Vol 3, No 2, 2011   ISSN:  1309-8055 (Online) 
 
  43
It is seen that both variables move in the same direction from the third period until 
the end of the eighth period. Although DLOAN gain stability after this period, the 
INV variable did not gain any stability until the end of the eighteenth period. As a 
result, based on the empirical findings of impulse-response and variance 
decomposition, it can be said that the DLOAN sensitivity of INV is high.  
Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Inv to M2 and DLOAN 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
During the credit crunch process considered as a supply phenomenon, the 
distortion of balance structures of borrowers changes the risk perception of banks. 
Therefore, the availability of credit significantly reduces as a result of banks being 
reluctant to provide a loan. In addition to this, provided that to be dependant also 
on countries financial structure, the process of credit crunch also brings with an 
investment collapse. In this study in which it is questioned whether a credit crunch 
has lead to an investment collapse in Turkey, it has been observed that money 
supply was not leading directly to an investment collapse. However, it was 
determined that monetary decisions indirectly led to private fixed investment 
collapse through credit channel. In other words, the decline of 100 % in credit 
supply leading to a decline of 140 % in private fixed investment shows an unusual 
(and suddenly) decline in both variables. This situation is considered to be usual 
particularly in Turkey where a bank dependant financial structure exists. As a 
result, in the light of the empirical findings obtained for the period examined for 
Turkey, it can be said that the credit crunch that we dealt with as a supply 
phenomenon leads to an investment collapse.  
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